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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Comment on Recent Decisions
ACCESSION-AUTOMOBILES--PRIORITY OF CONDITIONAL VENDOR OVER CHAT-
TEL MORTAGEE.-The case of Franklin Service Station, Inc. v. Sterling
Motor Truck Co. (R. I. 1929) 197 AtI. 754, holds that where a conditional
seller of new tires for a truck removed the old ones (retaining them) and
replaced them by new ones, a chattel mortgagee of the automobile was not
entitled to claim title to the new tires upon the theory of accession, since the
tires were not an integral and permanent part of the truck.
Although the law of accession is of early origin, the complex nature of
this right to acquire the property of another by its joinder with the owner's
own property has made it very difficult of reduction to generalizations and
precise rules. As between mortgagors and mortgagees repairs made by
the former become a part of the property, enhance the security, and pass
upon foreclosure of the mortgage or upon the vendor reclaiming the prop-
erty under a conditional sale. Southworth v. Isham (N. Y. 1850) 3 Sandf.
448; Holly v. Brown (1841) 14 Conn. 252. It has been so held even when
the value of the repairs greatly exceeds the value of the original article.
Gregory v. Stryker (N. Y. 1846) 2 Denio 628. In B~ackwood Tire & Vul-
canizing Co. v. Auto Storage Co. (1916) 133 Tenn. 15, 182 S. W. 576, it
was held that tire casings fitted to an automobile the title to which was re-
tamined in the vendor passed to him when he reclaimed the automobile for
non-payment of the purchase price as against the unpaid vendor of the
tires, who, however, had not retained title to them. And it has been held
that pneumatic tires and wheels sold on credit without retention of title
became part of a truck conditionally sold by the same seller. Purnell v.
Fooks (Del. 1923) 122 Atl. 901.
The doctrine of accession has not been held to apply against anyone who
has retained title to his repairs. It has been held that where the articles
attached consist of parts which can be identified and severed without injury
to the principal article, title thereto may be reserved in the person selling
them until they are paid for. Clark v. Wells (1872) 45 Vt. 3; Netzrog v.
National Supply Co. (1905) 28 Ohio C. C. 112; Alley v. Adams (1870) 44
Ala. 609.
The automobile is often assembled with parts purchased from different
dealers which are separable, readily identified, and replaceable. The de-
cision in the principal case to the effect that the new tires did not become a
part of the mortgage security is well adapted to the prevailing conditions
in the automobile trade. E. S., '31.
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION-FEDERAL TRADE COiMISSION-PUBLIC INTEREST
ESSENTIAL TO PROCEEDINGS.-Sec. 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(1914) 38 Stat. 719, c. 311, 15 U. S. C. 45, provides that a complaint may be
filed by the Commission only if it should appear that the proceedings by it
would be in the interest of the public. One Sammons had done business in
Washington, D. C. for many years as a maker of window shades under the
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name of "The Shade Shop." Defendants, who were interior decorators, be-
gan to sell window shades under the name "Shade Shop." The Federal
Trade Commission entered an order that defendant cease and desist, which
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia was requsted to enforce.
On appeal it was held that sec. 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act does
not provide private persons with ant administrative remedy for private
wrongs, and that the Commission had no power to proceed. Federal Trade
Commission v. Klesner"(1929) 50 S. Ct. 1.
The interpretation of the requirement in the Federal Trade Commission
Act that the Commission issue a complaint when "it shall appear to the
Commission that a proceeding by it would be to the interest of the public"
has been controverted. Text writers have maintained that a view such as
that taken in the principal case is hard to reconcile with the language of
sec. 5 of the Act, and that the intention appears to be to characterize the
procedure rather than the type of competition. Henderson, THE FEDERAL
TRADE Co IissIoN (1924) 52, 54. The section contains, first, an unqualified
declaration that "unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby
declared unlawful," and the next paragraph empowers the Commission to
prevent "the use of unfair methods of competition in commerce." The third
paragraph contains the provision in regard to "interest of the public." It
has been asserted that the statute leaves the Commission with discretion to
prosecute only those violations of the Act which it feels are serious. "It
would seem that the determination of public interest is an administrative
function only, not open to judicial review, except, perhaps where such de-'
termination is so arbitrary as to be beyond the powers of the Commis-
sion . ." M1echem, Procedural Practice Before the Federal Trade Com-
mission- (1922) 21 MIcH. L. Rnv. 139.
But judicial decisions are inclined to a different view. In Federal Trade
Commission v. Gratz (C. C. A. 3, 1919) 258 F. 314, it was held that this pro-
vision does not contemplate the prohibition of unfair methods between in-
dividuals, there being no authority given to individuals to present griev-
ances. The Gratz case was appealed to the Supreme Court but the decision
there does not touch on the question. Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz
(1920) 253 U. S. 421. See also Gulf Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission (C. C. A. 3, 1922) 282 F. 81, which raised but did not decide the
question, and New Jersey Asbestos Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C. C.
A. 2, 1920) 264 F. 509.
Public interest may be affected injuriously, although the business prac-
tices suppressed on account of unfair competition may not infringe any
right of private traders. See Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Hos-
iery Co. (1922) 258 U. S. 483, involving misbranding of goods; also Federal
Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co. (1922) 257 U. S. 441, involv-
ing a plan of merchandising for the purpose of fixing retail prices. The
Commission exercises a wide discretion in determining whether a proceed-
ing will be in the public interest, but to justify it in filing a complaint the
public interest must be specific and substantial. The Federal Trade Com-
mission has power to order suppressed a plan of merchandising in interstate
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss3/10
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
trade which has a tendency to unduly hinder competition or to create a
monopoly. Sometimes public interest is involved because the unfair methods
being used mean oppression of the weak by the strong. Federal Trade
Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co. (1922) 257 U. S. 444; Federal Trade
Commission v. Oppenheim, Obendorf, & Co., Inc. (C. C. A. 4, 1925) 5 F. (2d)
574; Kobi Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C. C. A. 2, 1927) 23 F. (2d) 41.
The principal case places emphasis on the fact that the practice complained
of arose out of hatred and malice. It was not claimed that the article sup-
plied by the defendant was inferior to that of the complainant or that the
public suffered financially. Therefore an order of the Commission prohib-
iting a practice which does not affect the public may be set aside by the
reviewing court. E. S., '31.
AGENCY-LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT BY INDEPENDENT
CoNTRACTR.-Appellants owned and operated for profit a dance and amuse-
ment hall to which the public was invited for entertainment and for which
charge was made. Appellants entered into a contract with an orchestra
leader to furnish music on certain nights, but they had no voice in the se-
lection of musicians, had no control over the players, and had no right to
determine the musical selections to be rendered during an evening's engage-
ment. The orchestra infringed appellee's copyrights on certain musical
numbers. Held, that appellants are liable in damages for the infringement.
Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1929)
36 F. (2d) 354.
It is an elementary rule of agency that if an employer uses due care in
the selection of one with whom he enters into a contract by which the other
party undertakes to accomplish a certain result with means of his own
choice the employer is not liable for the negligence of the contractor.
Mechem, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) sec. 1917. Stated briefly, the master is not
responsible for the torts of the independent contractor unless the latter was
hired to do some act in its nature illegal. However, despite this well settled
rule, the copyright infringement cases disregard it and hold the employer
liable. This holding, moreover, is uniform throughout England and the
United States. In Monaghan v. Taylor (1885) 2 T. L. R. 685, defendant
employed a singer and took no pains to ascertain what songs he proposed to
sing. He was present at the performance at which the singer infringed
plaintiff's copyright. Defendant was held liable on the ground that he had
caused the singer to sing the songs, including the one which was copyrighted
by plaintiff. The same doctrine is upheld in March v. Conquest (1864) 17
C. B. (N. S.) 418, 10 L. T. 717, and Performing Rights Society v. Thompson
(1918) 34 T. L. R. 351. Some American cases hold that the mere fact that
defendant operates a place for profit establishes his liability for permitting
the unlicensed use of musical compositions on the premises. Irving Berlin,
Inc. v. Daigle (D. C. E. D. La. 1928) 26 F. (2d) 149; Trott v. Boyd (C. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1899) 97 F. 586.
One case, which is typical, reasons thus: "He who employs a musician to
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